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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the extent to which body-worn cameras programs in Canada and the
U.S. befit the notion of counter-law. The research is theoretically based on Ericson’s (2007a)
framework of counter-law and the surveillant assemblage. The results indicate that body-worn
camera programs can be considered an extension of the existing surveillant assemblage. In the
U.S., numerous legislative amendments exempted body-worn cameras from certain legal
requirements and thus facilitated their integration into existing surveillance networks. In Canada,
legal amendments were not enacted through counter-law; nevertheless, the broadness and
inconsistency of existing legislation allowed body-worn camera programs to become part of the
surveillant assemblage. This thesis also contributes to refinements of counter-law I and the
surveillant assemblage by analyzing variations in how these concepts apply to localized contexts
of uncertainty.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The events that unfolded on August 9, 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri and July 17, 2014 in
New York City involved extreme police brutality and misconduct (see Lieb and Zagier, 2014;
Murray et al., 2014). Following these events, other videos of police misconduct have flooded the
Internet that further highlight the extent of this problem. There are numerous incidents of police
misconduct that have occurred in Canadian cities too (see Edwards, 2011; Hasham, 2013;
Woodward, 2014). Two of the most infamous cases are the death of Robert Dziekanski in 2007
at the hands of RCMP officers and the shooting of Sammy Yatim in 2013 by a Toronto police
officer (see Keller, 2015; Rogan, 2014). These high profile incidents of police brutality have
created a public uproar for justice and a demand to increase police accountability. The Sammy
Yatim incident sparked a nationwide push for body-worn cameras (Abid, 2014). These cameras
are being proposed as the technology that will significantly enhance police transparency and
accountability. These cameras are miniature audio and video recording devices that allow
officers to record their daily interactions with citizens (Mateescu, Rosenblat and Boyd, 2015).
Pilot projects are emerging at a rapid pace in several Canadian cities. For a pilot project, a small
number of police officers from a given police service are equipped with body-worn cameras. The
proposed aim of these projects is to test the effectiveness of body-worn cameras to monitor
police officer conduct (Burgmann, 2015; Gillis, 2014; Kotsis, 2014; Mahoney and Hui, 2014;
Nickel, 2015) Previous projects in the U.S. have claimed success by showing a drop in police
misconduct and citizen complaints against police (Carroll, 2014).
There are enormous privacy concerns regarding the implementation of body-worn
cameras. In Canadian police services, such as the Toronto Police Service, police officers would
activate their body-worn cameras every time they respond to a call for service or when
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investigating an incident (Mehta, 2015). These recordings are to be safely stored in a database
and used if a case of misconduct should arise. These body-worn cameras may also be used to
assist in police investigations such that the recordings will become evidence in court proceedings
(Derosa, 2015). The mobility of the body-worn camera makes the acquisition of consent to be
recorded from citizens very challenging because, unlike CCTV cameras, body-worn cameras are
attached to the uniform of a police officer.
The widely touted aim of body-worn cameras is to increase police accountability and
transparency by recording the conduct of a police officer who wears it (see Lorinc, 2014; Mehta,
2015; Van Rassel, 2013). However, given that the cameras are clipped onto the police officer
uniform and pointed outwards, they also allow for the mass surveillance of the citizenry with
whom the police officers are interacting on a daily basis. The technological potential is clearly
present to surveil the public indiscriminately. Body-worn cameras can be considered a part of the
surveillant assemblage. Ericson (2007a) explains that the surveillant assemblage may extend
beyond the traditional standards of law that are considered obstacles to strategies of pre-emption.
With the current lack of specific privacy legislation in Canada regarding body-worn cameras, the
information acquired through such recordings may exceed the original scope of many pilot
projects (see for example Monahan and Mokos, 2013).
To understand the emergence and nature of police body-worn cameras as well as their
potential to extend a blanket of surveillance on the public and further extend the surveillant
assemblage, this thesis used Ericson’s (2007a) ideas of the precautionary logic and counter-law.
The precautionary logic can be understood as the logic of uncertainty. It confronts the limits of
science and technology as producers of knowledge regarding frequency and severity of risks.
Science and technology become framed as producers of uncertainty with catastrophic potential.
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The use of the precautionary logic leads to the eventual criminalization of actions through
counter-law (Ericson, 2007a: 22). There are two kinds of counter-law. Counter-law I entails the
formation of new laws against existing law. New laws are created and new uses of existing law
are invented in order to eliminate or erode traditional principles and procedures of criminal law
that act as obstacles to the pre-emption of imagined sources of harm (Ericson 2007a: 24).
Counter-law II is the idea of surveillant assemblages (see also Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). The
surveillant assemblage entails a loose collection of varying forms of information (Wilkinson and
Lippert, 2012: 312). Essentially, the surveillant assemblage operates by abstracting human
bodies from there settings and categorizing them into different information flows (Haggerty and
Ericson, 2000: 606). These flows of information are then reorganized into distinct ‘data doubles’
(Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 606). The resulting ‘data doubles’ can now be targeted for various
purposes of intervention (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 606). Furthermore, Ericson (2007a: 24)
explains that new elements are constantly being incorporated into the existing surveillant
assemblage that in many cases result in the elimination traditional principles of criminal law that
block pre-emptive measures. This thesis was consequently guided by two research questions:
First, how and to what extent are police body-worn camera programs consistent with a
precautionary logic as well as with counter-law I and II? The mobility and surveillance potential
of body-worn cameras bring about unique legal and social challenges unseen before with other
video surveillance devices. Guided by this initial question, this thesis also asked: to what extent
does the model of counter-law I and II need to be refined to account for body-worn camera
programs and the unique challenges they pose?
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW: RESEARCH ON BODY-WORN CAMERAS
Police body-worn cameras have recently entered the forefront of policing in North
America; however, the current criminological literature lacks a coherent and in depth
investigation of body-worn camera programs. Although there are existing studies that address the
use of body-worn cameras, the majority of these studies focus on the effectiveness of these
devices in reducing complaints against police. An experiment conducted in Rialto, California had
54 officers randomly assigned to wear body-worn cameras (or not) based on the officer’s shift.
The experiment lasted 12 months and the officers equipped with cameras showed a 59 percent
reduction in use of force incidents and an 87.5 percent reduction in citizen complaints when
compared to estimates for all officers prior to implementation (Barak, Farrar and Sutherland,
2014). While this experiment had clearly outlined control and experimental groups and had a
randomized assignment of body-worn cameras, the drastic reductions in use of force and citizen
complaints make it questionable whether or not all possible variables were considered. Aside
from the questionable results, there is a very clear conflict of interest in the experiment. A coauthor of the study, W. A. Farrar, is the police chief for the Rialto Police Department (Carroll,
2013). Given this, the results may have been biased towards the effectiveness of the body-worn
cameras in this particular experiment.
Another experiment conducted in Mesa, Arizona revealed similar results. The Mesa
Police Department studied body-worn cameras for a one-year period and compared 50 officers
equipped with cameras to 50 other officers who did not have cameras. Their evaluation revealed
a 48 percent reduction in citizen complaints and 75 percent reduction in use of force complaints
against officers equipped with these cameras (Ready and Young, 2015). These reductions in
complaints are argued to be due to officers being more mindful and cautious with their actions
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when body-worn cameras are engaged. Officers are more likely to follow legal and constitutional
standards of conduct when a body-worn camera is present (Harris, 2010; Jennings, Fridell and
Lynch, 2014; Ready and Young, 2015). While these two studies are noteworthy, they have relied
exclusively on randomized control trials focused on the effectiveness of body-worn cameras in
reducing complaints against police. These studies provide an inadequate understanding of the
greater implications of body-worn cameras programs within criminological theory. This research
project intends to address these gaps and effectively situate body-worn camera programs within
the larger counter-law framework and the surveillant assemblage.
Aside from previously discussed benefits of body-worn cameras to reduce complaints,
these devices could reduce police exposure to litigation. Police officers equipped with bodyworn cameras are claimed to potentially save a police department significant amount of
resources on civil law suit damage payouts and legal costs (Ramirez, 2014). However, these
claims have not been backed up by detailed reports of the costs involved. While body-worn
cameras have the potential to assist in separating legitimate from meritless complaints, (see Roy,
2014), there is no research evidence of the benefits of body-worn cameras as a resource saving
tool. Nevertheless, police departments across North America are rapidly initiating pilot projects
despite the inconclusive research (Lorinc, 2014). While the widespread deployment of these
cameras in the face of inconclusive research is problematic on its own, existing research is
inadequate in conceptually framing body-worn camera programs as a resource saving tool. This
research responds to this gap by examining how body-worn camera programs can be considered
a type of precautionary response to recent police brutality incidents.
While the proposed aim of body-worn cameras is to increase police accountability and
transparency, these devices may also be used for the collection of video evidence unrelated to
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police misconduct incidents (Victoria Police Service, 2010). Although the usefulness of these
cameras in evidence collection has not yet been conclusively demonstrated, there are a few
isolated cases where they provided enhanced evidence useful during trials. For example,
evidence gathered through the use of body-worn cameras at domestic violence incidents have
been demonstrated to being useful in supporting witnesses through the court process in the UK
(see Goodall, 2007). Although these cameras may provide supplemental information for legal
cases (see also Fouche, 2014), it is unclear whether or not this information may be useful in all
types of cases. The study conducted in the UK aimed to specifically test the effectiveness of
body-worn cameras in the collection of evidence (Goodall, 2007). However, absent in this study
is how the evidence that is collected may also be used for surveillance purposes and to monitor
the citizenry. As an evidence gathering tool, body-worn cameras may record information that
extends beyond that which may be useful for court trials. This research will address such gaps by
examining how the collection of evidence through body-worn cameras may lead to the extension
of the surveillant assemblage.
While the majority of the existing projects examined the overall effectiveness of bodyworn cameras, Brucato (2015) attempts to conceptualize these devices in existing surveillance
theory as a type of counter-sousveillance technology. With the increasing of citizen recordings of
police behaviour, these devices attempt to nullify citizen recordings by favouring the officer’s
point of view through the use of body-worn cameras. Brucato (2015) explains that police
agencies are adopting these devices with the idea of protecting officers from frivolous
complaints. While Brucato (2015) problematizes the presumed objectivity of body-worn camera
recordings, he does not address that these devices may also be used to surveill the citizenry for
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purposes of gathering information. This research attempts to bridge this gap by conceptualizing
body-worn cameras as a new police surveillance tool part of the existing surveillant assemblage.
Aside from concerns for citizen surveillance, the adoption of body-worn camera
programs creates numerous legal implications that remain inadequately addressed in existing
research. Officers equipped with these cameras have the capability to record the inside of private
residences, which in certain contexts may constitute an invasion of privacy at an intimate level
(Ramirez, 2014; Stanley, 2015). In the U.S., numerous state legislatures enacted new legislation
to regulate the use of body-worn cameras as a response to these concerns. Parts of these
legislations intended to exempt body-worn camera footage from disclosure requirements within
existing public records legislation (Newell, 2016). While public access to body-worn camera
recordings is an important aspect of increasing police transparency, public disclosure of camera
footage may jeopardize individual privacy rights. As a result, these exemptions become largely
justified by the fact that they are intended to protect individual privacy rights (Newell, 2016).
Despite such justifications, existing literature neglects to address the larger implications of these
exemptions to existing standards of law. This research will examine how such exemptions
facilitate the use of body-worn cameras as a new surveillance device through the criminalizing
process of counter-law.
Body-worn cameras are being implemented at an alarming rate both in Canada and the
U.S. whilst legislation on their use is either lagging behind or simply nonexistent (see Lorinc,
2014). Aside from the focus of body-worn cameras on creating better accountability and
transparency of police interactions with the public, these cameras have the potential for other
purposes that the current literature does not address and of which the public seem unaware. The
lack of adequate legislation allows for the possibility of body-worn cameras to be moulded into a
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new police surveillance device through function creep. Omitted from existing research is how the
incoherence of existing privacy legislation facilitates the use of body-worn cameras further than
their initially intended purpose. Existing research is ripe with the benefits of body-worn cameras;
however, this is inadequate to understand the much larger implications of body-worn camera
programs within counter-law and the surveillant assemblage (see Jennings, Fridell and Lynch,
2014; Miller et al., 2014).
The aim of this thesis was therefore to examine and critically analyze the legal and
discursive frameworks that underlie the implementation of police body-worn camera programs
through a counter-law and precautionary logic approach as well as to determine how and to what
extent body-worn camera programs reflect Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework and logic
of uncertainty. Furthermore, the numerous privacy concerns involved with the use of body-worn
cameras require careful examination in relation to Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ERICSON’S COUNTER-LAW REGIME
There has been an expanding shift in recent criminological literature towards examination
and analysis of risk (see Goold, Loader and Thumala, 2010; Lentzos and Rose, 2009; O’Malley,
2002). The obsession with the predictability of risks and dangers through risk management
techniques has become the centre point of the neoliberal risk society. Individuals, organizations,
and environments are sorted into different categories that fit with the purpose of the institution
that desires their increasing predictability (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Pre-emptive notions are
apparent in anticipatory endeavours and actuarial predictions that are focused on minimizing loss
(Zedner, 2007). As a result, current criminological inquiries have been entirely refocused,
shifting away from the causes of crime and their prevention towards pre-emption (Zedner, 2007).
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The notion of precautionary logic is central to Ericson’s (2007a) notion of uncertainty. The focus
of the precautionary principle is on uncertainties that have no calculable price, such as
catastrophes. The idea of the precautionary logic has moved beyond the calculable loss
prevention through risk management techniques (Ericson, 2007a). According to Lyon (2003), in
the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, suspicion became commonplace. The aftermath was
marked by a time of crisis that generated extraordinary measures of pre-emption that relied on
public feelings of insecurity and uncertainty. These measures go beyond the limits of the
traditional principles of law and as a result risky populations become criminalized based on
actuarial knowledge of potential harms. Risky populations are those individuals who are
predicted, based on actuarial knowledge, to have the highest likelihood of being involved in
problematic activities or behaviours (see Ericson, 2007a). In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, individuals that befit the descriptions of a terrorist were detained and interrogated simply
on the basis of actuarial knowledge that they could be involved in terrorist activities (see Lyon,
2003). Nevertheless, these extraordinary responses are justified by the precautionary logic
(Ericson, 2007a).
Risky populations are actively criminalized through applications of counter-law.
Criminalization through counter-law I has occurred in numerous cases (see Ericson, 2007a;
Ericson, 2007b; Levi, 2009). Counter-law I entails the creation of laws against law. New laws
are created and new uses of existing laws are developed to eliminate traditionally enshrined
principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that act as obstacles for the effective preemption of imagined harms (Ericson, 2007a). With the application of criminalization through
counter-law I, every imaginable sources of harm are reconceptualized as criminal acts. The
counter-law regime is effectively designed to cast the net as widely as possible, identify the
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suitable enemies, abandon any thought about false identification, eliminate any pretense of due
process and ultimately to create summary justice through incapacitation, torture and elimination
(Ericson, 2007a).
Part of the larger theoretical framework of counter-law, the surveillant assemblage, or
counter-law II, is very closely interconnected with counter-law I (see Haggerty and Ericson,
2000). The surveillant assemblage operates by means of absorbing individuals from their
contextual settings and then separating them into different categories. These categories are then
sorted into ‘data doubles’, which become the targets of intervention (Haggerty and Ericson,
2000). Wilkinson and Lippert (2012: 312) refer to the surveillant assemblage as a loose
collection of varying forms of information that temporarily converge to work together. As a
visualizing device, the suveillant assemblage integrates various types of information about an
individual’s body and renders it more mobile and comparable (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000).
Ultimately, the information that is gathered through the different flows of the surveillant
assemblage becomes scrutinized with the purpose of creating different strategies for the
governance and control of the human population (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). As part of
counter-law II, Ericson (2007a) explains that new elements are constantly being integrated into
the existing surveillent assemblage that subsequently also eliminate traditional standards and
procedures of criminal law that act as barriers to measures of pre-emption (Ericson, 2007a).
Contemporary techniques of surveillance have moved beyond the Foucaultian
explanation of a disciplinary function of surveillance towards a security function (see Foucault,
1977). Apparatuses of discipline operate through methods of prevention, corrections as well as
enforcement. Apparatuses of security on the other hand operate through varying thresholds of
tolerance. As a result, security surveillance is aimed at the measurement at a distance of objects
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and events to identify what is beyond a specified tolerance threshold (Deukmedjian, 2013).
Ericson’s (2007a) logic of uncertainty operates within neoliberal social imaginaries that heavily
rely on conceptualizations of risk and the application of the precautionary logic. Given the
dominance of risk taking over risk aversion in the neoliberal risk society today, Ericson’s
(2007a) counter-law regime is beyond the disciplinary function of surveillance, with the focus
being on security through efforts of pre-emption by means of criminalization through counterlaw.
There is an increasing convergence of discrete systems of surveillance and the past two
decades are marked by an exponential proliferation of information and data gathering techniques
(Hier, 2003). The notion of the surveillant assemblage marks the movement away from panoptic
to post-panoptic systems of surveillance in which social control becomes deterritorialized
(Bogard, 2006: 97). Within the post-panoptic era, CCTV surveillance for example loses its
deterrent effect and instead becomes conceptualized as part of the surveillant assemblage (see
Lippert, 2009). However, the criminalization process advanced by the surveillant assemblage
encounters various forms of resistance. With the abundance of visual information due to the
prevalence of CCTV surveillance, there are increasing levels of resistance from policing agents
due to heightened levels of workload (see Wilkinson and Lippert, 2012). Resistance may take the
form of technical, organizational, and social processes that consequentially hinder the movement
of visual information through the police institution (Wilkinson and Lippert, 2012: 313).
Technical limitations and the reliance on human labour leads to only a select few CCTV images
becoming targets of intervention by the police institution, while filtering out the remaining
majority (Wilkinson and Lippert, 2012: 324). However, resistance of the kind mentioned above
will be thwarted through technological advancement enabled by the surveillant assemblage.
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Increasing levels of technological sophistication, such as real time video analysis, will reduce
dependence on human labour and ultimately overcome the resistance to new surveillance
systems (see Wilkinson and Lippert, 2012: 320).
The notion of counter-law I and the surveillant assemblage have been refined numerous
times since their initial conceptualization by Ericson (2007a) and Ericson and Haggerty (2000).
Although Ericson (2007a) effectively conceptualized the counter-law framework within realms
of national, social, corporate and domestic securities, new developments are constantly arising
that incorporate varying applications of counter-law. Ericson (2007a: 208) points out that there is
considerable variation across applications of counter-law and the surveillant assemblage
dependent on the localized politics of uncertainty. His book is intended to illustrate areas that
most effectively exemplify the overall presence of the counter-law regime. However,
refinements to the counter-law framework are needed to account for these variations.
There are numerous refinements to the counter-law framework that have been put
forward by scholars. Their intent was to exemplify variations across the theoretical application of
counter-law. Lippert (2009) has refined the counter-law regime regarding CCTV camera
configurations and their relationship with law. With an increasingly heavy reliance on CCTV
signage, CCTV cameras lose their deterrent and panoptic effects and instead become part of the
surveillant assemblage.

CCTV signs become just as important as the cameras themselves

because they expose the citizenry to a political subjectification through the surveillant
assemblage.
Ericson (2007a) conceptualizes the function of counter-law I as a type of criminalizing
force. The enactment of new laws erodes certain standards of law and ultimately criminalize a
certain segments of the population or a type of activity. However, Levi (2009) further refined
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this criminalizing force of counter-law with its application in the Gang Congregation Ordinance
in Chicago during the 1990s to the counter-law regime. This Ordinance intended to criminalize
certain perceived threats by expanding the interpretive and definitional limits of ‘harmful’
conduct. However, these laws were intentionally created to be very broad (Levi, 2009: 133). This
inherent broadness exemplifies Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework very effectively
because it shows how the Gang Ordinance intended to cast the net as widely as possible and to
identify all the suitable enemies.
More recently, Chase (2012) refined the counter-law framework with its application in
Canada’ peace bond regime. In Canadian law, peace bonds are orders put forward by a court that
obligate a person to be on good behaviour for a predetermined about of time. For the duration of
the peace bond, the individual cannot be charged with other criminal offences (Chase, 2012).
Although peace bonds do not put forward a criminalizing process, they ultimately illustrate
tenets of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework though their rampant erosions of due process
by reducing the criminal burden of proof of “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Chase (2012)
exemplifies that the peace bond program befits the counter-law framework because it allows for
exceptions to take hold that ultimately erode traditional standards of law. As such, Chase (2012)
illustrates that counter-law does not necessarily require a criminalizing force. Exceptions to
traditional legal standards regarding peace bonds nevertheless exemplify the presence of counterlaw.
By incorporating the understanding of the precautionary logic and counter-law, this thesis
critically examined the extent of the presence of the precautionary logic and a counter-law
regime within the development and subsequent use of police body-worn cameras by North
American police. Given the unique aspects and variations within body-worn camera programs,
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this thesis also looked at how and to what extent counter-law I and II are concepts that need to be
refined in relation to police body-worn camera programs.

4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES
To understand the discursive frameworks regarding body-worn camera programs as well
as the extent to which these discourses on body-worn camera programs reflect Ericson’s (2007a)
precautionary logic and counter-law, five different data sources were examined. First, I
examined the body-worn camera program policy texts of five different police services in
Canada1 that have had pilot projects or were in the process of implementing one during the time
of this research. Given that police body-worn cameras are only starting to be implemented by
Canadian police, I also looked 33 different police agencies from the U.S. 2 that have completed
or were completing pilot projects during the time of this research. To determine the extent to
which Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law and precautionary logic is reflected, it was central to
analyze how body-worn camera programs are conceptualized and justified by law enforcement
authorities who are being equipped with these devices.
Second, in addition to police program texts that provide a law enforcement point of view,
print media has a vast array of information regarding body-worn cameras that provide a different
perspective. Well established news websites and newspapers have extensive reports on various
issues concerning body cameras and their implementation. Similarly, with program texts, the
print media documents I analyzed covered both Canadian and United States contexts. The
purpose behind looking at print media was to get a better understanding of the overall public
1

Canadian police services included: Amherstburg (ON), Calgary (AB), Edmonton (AB), Toronto (ON), Victoria (BC)
U.S. police agencies included: Phoenix (AZ), Los Angeles (CA), Rialto (CA), New Haven (CT), Denver (CO), Washington
(DC), Miami (FL), Atlanta (GA), Coeur d’Alene (ID), Chicago (IL), Greenwood (IN), Iowa City (IA), Wichita (KS), Louisville
(KY), Baltimore (MD), Boston (MA), Ferguson (MO), Minneapolis (MN), Missoula (MT), Las Vegas (NV), New York (NY),
Charlotte (NC), Cleveland (OH), Charleston (SC), Knoxville (TN), West Valley City (UT), Burlington (VT), Gordonsville (VA),
Seattle (WA), Milwaukee (WI), Mills (WY)
2
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perception surrounding the implementation of body-worn cameras. Well established news
websites such as The Globe and Mail provided valuable insight into the public’s opinion of
body-worn cameras and the popular belief surrounding their use as well as problematic aspects
of their use. The material published by print media was also be analyzed to determine how and to
what extent it was reflective of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law regime.
Third, various body-worn camera manufacturers’ websites provided a unique viewpoint
on how these devices become marketed. These websites provided unique information about
various technological features and also different purposes these devices may be useful for.
Furthermore, the analysis of body-worn camera manufacturers’ websites provided insight into
the potential technological capacities of these devices and the extent to which they fit into the
counter-law framework, and more specifically the notion of the surveillant assemblage (Ericson,
2007a).
Fourth, privacy guidelines and legislation contained information on the privacy concerns
regarding body-worn cameras. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada was a crucial
source for data regarding guidelines to be followed on the use of body-worn cameras. To
determine how and to what extent privacy guidelines regarding police body-worn cameras reflect
Ericson’s (2007) counter-law framework, the recently published Guidance for the Use of BodyWorn Cameras by Law Enforcement Authorities by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada was analyzed. This guidance was at the time and currently still is the only document that
addresses the privacy concerns that have recently come to light because of body-worn cameras.
This guidance was simply intended to provide law enforcement authorities with different things
to take into consideration when implementing body-worn cameras. Furthermore, other crucial
legislation analyzed included: Privacy Act, Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of
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Privacy Act, and the Canada Evidence Act. These pieces of legislation were analyzed and coded
using Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law approach based on their relationship to the implementation
and use of body-worn cameras. I have also looked at various pieces of legislation for the U.S.
that addressed the implementation of body-worn cameras. Given the extensive legislative
autonomy of each state, I analyzed the legislative amendments regarding body-worn cameras of
32 different U.S. states3.
Lastly, I selected three police services in Canada that initiated pilot projects for bodyworn cameras to focus upon in more detail. The focus was on the municipal police services of
Amherstburg (Ontario), Calgary (Alberta) and lastly Edmonton (Alberta). I submitted freedom of
information requests to each of these police services to access general records regarding the
implementation of their specific pilot projects. The Freedom of Information Act was a valuable
research tool on policing security related practices (see Lippert and Walby, 2012). The purpose
of these requests was to provide crucial insight into the numerous considerations surrounding
funding, cost, retention, as well as use of body-worn cameras and ultimately to supplement the
earlier mentioned data sources. Gathering information through Freedom of Information requests
helped to provide better insights into details and practices that would otherwise would have been
hidden and as a result become rarely analyzed (see Lippert and Walby, 2012). Moreover, the
requests requested information regarding the underlying rationale behind the decision to
implement body-worn cameras and any measures of effectiveness.
To fully and critically answer the research questions, this thesis used discourse analysis
as its method. “A discourse is a set of interrelated texts, in which the practices of their
production, dissemination and reception bring an object into being” (Philips and Hardy, 2002: 3).
3 U.S. states: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming

17

Texts are considered a discursive ‘unit’ and a material manifestation of discourse (Chalaby,
1996). Considering Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework, the analysis of text was the most
crucial component of this thesis. For the purpose of this study, the discourse that was examined
was the representation of police body-worn cameras in written texts, specifically police program
texts, security magazines, print media, privacy legislation and freedom of information requests.
This discourse was analyzed in relation to Ericson’s counter-law approach. To aid with the
analysis of the police body-worn camera discourse, I coded for central themes that aimed to
capture something important about the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this case, the analysis
of the body-worn camera discourse aimed to capture whether parts of Ericson’s counter-law
were operationalized in the texts. The notion of precautionary logic was analyzed in its relation
to body-worn cameras as a response to police brutality and misconduct. Legal aspects associated
with body-worn cameras were also examined, such as the Guidance for the Use of Body-Worn
Cameras by Law Enforcement Authorities. Although the guidance is not considered legislation, it
nevertheless contained aspects of counter-law I. Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) surveillant
assemblage was also operationalized in terms of the capabilities of extending surveillance
networks and practices of police services through the use of body-worn cameras. These camera
programs were examined for how they fit into the surveillant assemblage and whether their use
extended beyond traditional procedures and principles of criminal law. While there may be
similarities in body-worn camera programs across Canada and the U.S., I did not engage in any
comparisons. As a result, I analyzed these programs separately for each country under separate
subheadings. Ultimately, this analysis examined the discourse of police body-worn cameras in
Canada and the U.S. to determine how and whether it befits Ericson’s (2007) counter-law
approach and whether any refinement was required of this approach.
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5. ANALYSIS
I. Presence of Precautionary Logic
The notions of risk and precaution regarding police body-worn cameras become
pronounced when considering the reason behind their rise in policing and their proposed aim.
Amongst the primary aims of increasing police accountability and transparency, one of the other
purported aims of body-worn cameras is their potential ability to reduce police exposure to
litigation and unwanted citizen complaints (Ramirez, 2014). Whether or not body-worn cameras
can indeed reduce the unwanted citizen complaints against police and their exposure to civil
litigation remains to be seen. Nevertheless, one of the major claims of police pilot projects both
in Canada and the U.S. remains that these cameras have the potential to reduce complaints
against police (see Barak, Farrar and Sutherland, 2014; Calgary Police Service, 2015a;
Edmonton Police Service, 2015b; Ready and Young, 2015). The current body-worn camera
program in place at Calgary Police Service identifies the reduction of complaints from citizens as
one of the benefits that may come about as a result of body-worn cameras (Calgary Police
Service, 2015a: 18).
The frequency of unwanted citizen complaints against police can be conceptually
considered a risk to police legitimacy in the eyes of the public that police services
consequentially have to deal with (see Kochel, 2015). Within conceptualizations of risk, the
frequency of harmful occurrences and the severity of the harm caused are of paramount
importance (Ericson, 2007a). As such, the frequency of complaints against police and the
severity of these complaints become crucial factors in risk analysis. Although overall complaints
against police have been decreasing (see Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2007; Shallwani
and Dawsey, 2015; Williams, 2015), the frequency and severity of high profile police brutality
incidents have been seemingly increasing and consequentially pose a risk to the legitimacy of the
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overall police institution (see Wines and Cohen, 2015). As such, the widespread implementation
of body-worn camera programs across North American police departments invoke a
precautionary response to the uncertainties surrounding future police brutality incidents.
In the aftermath of 9/11, suspicion and surveillance intensified significantly. Everyone
became the target of surveillance (Lyon, 2003). The U.S. Patriot Act was enacted following 9/11
and it aimed to give unlimited presidential authority to criminalize “unlawful enemy
combatants”. The aim was to criminalize these suspects for an imagined future harm they might
cause. However, the major consequence of the U.S. Patriot Act was the unprecedented powers of
surveillance it gave to state authorities. Although foreign terrorist attacks the scale of 9/11 have
not occurred since 2001, the main justification for intensified surveillance is the threat of future
terrorist attacks. “The FBI justified electronic surveillance applications in the name of foreign
threats to national security” (Ericson, 2007a: 56). The precautionary justifications of future
attacks become the focal point for the intensification of surveillance.
The aftermath of the Ferguson, Missouri incident signified the start of a push for bodyworn cameras. Similarly, to the terrorist threats to national security, incidents of police brutality
and citizen complaints become conceptualized as threats to police legitimacy. Consequentially,
police body-worn cameras can be regarded as a precautionary tool because of their focus on
uncertainties, such as the future occurrence of more incidents of police brutality.
Police agencies are rapidly adopting these devices with the purpose of saving police
resources from being spent on civil law suits. The proposed benefit as potential tools to save
police resources by preventing future frivolous complaints does act as a major justification to
move forward with their widespread adoption. Calgary Police Service (2015c: 2) states that “one
of the purposes of using body-worn cameras is to reduce frivolous complaints about alleged
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misconduct”. It remains inconclusive whether the reduction of frivolous complaints saves police
resources. However, the widespread implementation of these cameras in face of such
inconclusive research befits the notion of a precautionary response.
“The politics of uncertainty leads to enormous expenditures on risk assessment and
management that reveal the limits of risk based reasoning and intensify uncertainty” (Ericson,
2007a: 1). After 9/11, surveillance of the public greatly intensified and enormous resources were
appropriated for national security based on precautionary measures (Ericson, 2007a). Similarly,
the politics of uncertainty is clearly present within the current body-worn camera discourses
regarding their proposed costs and benefits. A few isolated success stories do show the ability of
body-worn cameras to exonerate police officers of unsubstantiated citizen complaints that would
have otherwise cost a police service a large amount of resources. The mere presence of these
recordings in many cases leads to the alleged plaintiffs to simply drop the accusations (Calgary
Police Service, 2015a). However, Edmonton Police Service’s 3-year pilot program reveals that
these cameras made no statistical difference in resolving police complaints (Casey, 2016;
Edmonton Police Service, 2015b). Despite the inconclusive results from Edmonton, a few
particular success incidents act as a strong enough justification that the potential is there. This
resulting uncertainty leads to the “enormous expenditures” that are currently being spent on the
deployment of body-worn cameras. Calgary Police Service’s pilot program also reveals
inconsistent results on whether body-worn cameras are effective in saving resources.
Nevertheless, they plan to roll out 1,100 cameras by the end of 2016 regardless of the
inconsistent results produced in the pilot study (Casey, 2016). This undoubtedly befits the
conceptualization of a precautionary response.
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Although there are no detailed statistical reports available that highlight the degree of
police resources spent on police misconduct lawsuits, in the U.S. these resources are estimated to
be in the millions (see Wing, 2015). Between 2011 and 2014, the city of Baltimore spent $5.7
million on lawsuits involving allegations of false arrests, false imprisonment and excessive force.
Moreover, these lawsuits were paid for through taxpayer funds (Puente, 2014). These figures
covered a period of three years only for Baltimore, a medium sized U.S. city. Lawsuit costs may
be proportionally higher across the U.S. for larger police agencies and larger cities. In Canada, a
similar situation exists. Between 2000 and 2015, the Toronto Police Service has spent $27
million on civil lawsuits (see Andrew-Gee, 2013). The majority of the settlement claims included
allegations of use of force, false arrests and negligent investigations. It is clear that both in
Canada and the U.S., police services spend a large amount of resources on civil lawsuits that are
appropriated through taxpayer funds (Andrew-Gee, 2013).
Whether or not the widespread departmental adoption of body-worn cameras is
considered an entrepreneurially wise risk taking endeavour to deal with police misconduct
incidents becomes insignificant (see Deukmedjian, 2014). According to Ericson (2007a),
uncertainty itself is what leads to expenditures on risk assessments that consequentially reveal
the limits of risk based reasoning. As such, the conceptualizations of body-worn cameras clearly
befit the theoretical confines of a precautionary tool within the larger politics of uncertainty and
risk.

II. Counter-Law I: Law against Law
The notion of the precautionary logic and counter-law are conceptually linked. Precaution
fuels suspicion, as was exemplified in the aftermath of 9/11 with the intensification of
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surveillance (see Lyon 2003). As a result, the application of the precautionary logic progresses to
the criminalization of certain activities through counter-law. There are numerous examples of
previously legal activities that became criminalized with the enactment of counter-law (see
Ericson, 2007a; Ericson 2007b; Levi, 2009; Lippert and Wilkinson, 2010; Wilkinson and
Lippert, 2012). The process by which most of these activities became criminalized was the
enactment of laws or legal reforms intended to counteract already existing laws. These new
reforms or laws were essentially invented with the purpose of eroding or eliminating traditional
principles, standards and procedures of existing law. However, counter-law I may also take the
form of a “state of exception” (see Agamben, 2005). Under exceptional circumstances like a
state of emergency, normal legal principles, standards and procedures may be suspended
(Ericson, 2007a). The politics of uncertainty becomes a strong factor in justifying when such
exceptional measures may be implemented.

A) United States
Body-worn camera programs have been introduced by police agencies across to the U.S.
at a very rapid pace. However, legislation in some states has only caught up to this technology in
the past year. To an extent, the legislative amendments that address body-worn cameras are very
similar in each state; however, given the large degree of state autonomy in the U.S., there are
some significant differences in some situations. When it comes to the deployment of body-worn
cameras in general, the presence of uncertainty does not directly lead to the criminalization of
certain activities through counter-law I as Ericson (2007a) conceptualized. The legislative
amendments in the U.S. regarding body-worn cameras in many cases legally enabled these
devices to be used in situations where under normal circumstances their use might have been
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prohibited (see Georgia General Assembly, 2015; Nevada General Assembly, 2015; Utah
General Assembly, 2015). In these cases, the presence of counter-law I is expressed through
legislative amendments resulting in exemptions to privacy and public records law.
When it comes to privacy legislation in general, there is a two-fold divide in the U.S., the
majority of the states allow only for single-party4 consent when recording audio and video
communications (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012: 7). A single-party consent system entails the
notion of consent only from the part of the officer. As such, when it comes to the use of bodyworn cameras in these particular states, notification of recording is not required (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2012: 7). Consequentially, the absence of any notification also entails the
absence of being able to consent to the actual recording from the part of the citizen. The state of
Iowa is a single party consent state and as a result notification of recording is not legally required
under any existing legislation. Nevertheless, the Iowa General Assembly does address the notion
of consent when it comes to body-worn camera recordings. Section 2(5) states that “a person
shall inform a person when that person is being recorded by a body camera unless informing the
person would be unsafe, impractical, or impossible” (Iowa General Assembly, 2015: 3). The
acquisition of consent on part of the citizen also becomes desirable when entering a person’s
residence without a warrant or where no exigent circumstances exist. In situations like that,
section 2(5)(a) states that “the peace officer shall immediately ask whether the resident desires
the peace officer to stop the body cameras recording while the peace officer is in the residence”
(Iowa General Assembly, 2015: 3). While it may appear that consent is actually required from
the citizen when the recording is occurring in their private homes, section 2(5)(a) does not

4

States with single-party consent systems: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming
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address whether or not the officer is legally required to comply with the citizen’s request to cease
the recording. Consequentially, the police officer holds a significant amount of discretion
whether or not to turn the camera off in such circumstances.
Other single-party consent states also amended their privacy legislation to facilitate the
operation of body-worn cameras in general. In the state of Georgia, the acquisition of consent in
public areas did not pose an obstacle to the operation of body-worn cameras given that Georgia
is a single-consent state. Obstacles arose when the area where the recording occurred was inside
of a private residence. The state of Georgia passed bill no. 94 that intended to amend existing
legislation to allow body-worn camera recordings to occur inside a private residence without the
acquisition of citizen consent if the officer’s presence was lawful or was pursuant to an
investigation (Georgia General Assembly, 2015). The American Civil Liberties Union (herein
referred to as ACLU) opposed various parts of this bill. They proposed that in cases of nonemergency or where there is no reasonable suspicion of wrong doing, the police should be
required to ask for consent to record in private places (Torres, 2015). Despite ACLU concerns,
bill no. 94 received the signature of the governor and was passed into law at the start of April
2015. The act also specifically notes at the end in section 7 that “all laws and parts of laws in
conflict with this Act are repealed (Georgia General Assembly, 2015: 5). As such, section 7 is
intended to override existing laws that may be in conflict with bill no. 94. Under normal
circumstances, operating a video/audio recording device inside a private residence would be
considered unlawful on U.S. soil. However, this particular amendment legalizes such an activity
specifically regarding body-worn cameras operated by police officers. The above discussed
amendments effectively erode traditional standards of law because they exempt the use of bodyworn cameras from certain legal requirements that are perceived as obstacles to their operation.
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Although the majority of the states only allow for single party consent during video and
audio communications, a few states are part of the two-party5 consent system and require all
parties to consent to recording of video and audio communications (U.S. Department of Justice,
2012: 8). Under the two-party consent laws, police officers are legally required to inform the
citizens when a recording is occurring and also to obtain the citizen’s consent to record (Miller et
al., 2014). The two-party consent system is a significant challenge to the operation of body-worn
cameras because on many occasions, citizens would deny the consent to record and as a result
police officers were legally required to turn the camera off. The state of Washington is a twoparty consent state and required officers to obtain consent before initiating a recording. However,
amendments were made to existing privacy legislation to eliminate this need to acquire consent
when operating body-worn cameras. The Washington Supreme Court reassessed and
reinterpreted the Washington Privacy Act that a conversation between a police officer and a
member of the public that occurs during the officer’s duties is not considered private. As a result,
consent on part of the citizen is not required (Sullivan, 2014). The Seattle Police Department
body-worn camera policy text also addressed the notion of consent. Their policy requirements
similarly reinterpret the need for consent like the Washington Supreme Court. The policy clearly
states that in private residences, officers will ask for the individual’s consent to record with the
body-worn camera. The request and the response must be recorded and if the request is denied
by the individual, the officer must comply and turn the camera off during the time that they are
in the private area (Seattle Police Department, 2015: 3). However, the policy text categorizes this
requirement as an exception to the rule as being the only situation when the acquisition of

5 States with two-party consent systems: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Washington
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consent is required from the citizen. When an interaction is occurring in public areas, consent is
no longer required and as such does not pose an obstacle to the operation of body-worn cameras.
The state of Washington is not the only state with a two-party consent system that
amended its privacy legislation and subsequently created exemptions to the two-party rule
regarding the use of body-worn cameras. In the state of California, there are numerous police
agencies that have initiated body-worn camera pilot projects. One of them being Los Angeles
Police Department which is in the process of deploying 7,000 body-worn cameras by the end of
2016 (see Markowitz, 2016). California being a two-party consent state, such consent
requirements would significantly hinder the use of these 7,000 proposed body-worn cameras.
Consequentially, the state of California legislature amended sections of its penal code and
privacy legislation regarding the use of body-worn cameras. Existing law in California makes it a
crime to intentionally record a confidential communication without the consent of all parties to
the communication. The proposed amendments would exempt certain peace officers from this
particular consent requirement if they were acting within the scope of their authority (California
General Assembly, 2015). The amendment does not go into more detail about what constitutes a
peace officer’s scope of authority; nevertheless, the amendment effectively exempts body-worn
cameras from consent requirements under the two-party consent system. The Los Angeles Police
Department body-worn camera policy text reveals similar exemptions to the use of these devices.
Although officers are encouraged (though not legally required) to inform the citizens whom they
are interacting with that a recording is occurring, they are not required to obtain consent from the
members of the public if the officers are lawfully in the area where the particular recording is
taking place. This also includes private residences, given that the officers presence in someone’s
private home is considered lawful (Los Angeles Police Department, 2015). The notion of what is
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to be considered a lawful presence for an officer is not elaborated on and as a result becomes
very ambiguities and open to interpretation.
In all of the 12 states that are considered to be part of the two-party consent system, their
privacy legislation was amended and exemptions were created that facilitated the operation of
body-worn cameras in these states by removing the obstacles of citizen consent. Such
exemptions are evidence for the presence of counter-law because the legislative amendments that
were enacted eroded traditional principles, standards and procedures of privacy law (see Ericson,
2007a: 24). Although Ericson (2007a) addressed counter-law I with relation to the erosion of
standards and principles in the area of criminal law, counter-law I can occur and does occur in
other areas of law as well, as illustrated by these legislative amendments in privacy legislation
and the subsequent exemptions they created.
Such legislative amendments regarding the operation of body-worn cameras are not only
occurring in privacy legislation. Public records law has been amended in many states where
body-worn camera projects have been initiated. Public records are defined as “all documents,
papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sounds recordings, data processing
software, or other material, regardless of physical form, characteristics, or means of
transmission, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in connection with the transactions
of official business by any agency” (Florida General Assembly, 2015). Under this definition,
body-worn camera recordings become interpreted as a public record that may be requested to be
viewed by any member of the public. Although each state has its own public records law, the
general outlines of what a public record entails is very similar across all states. With the advent
of body-worn camera programs, many state legislatures amended their public records law to limit
public accessibility to these recordings (see Table 1). The state of Louisiana amended its statutes
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regarding body-worn cameras. Although Louisiana did not specifically amend sections of their
public record law, bill no. 183 did make body-worn camera records completely exempt from the
audio and video data requirements provided for in Louisiana’s Public Records Law (Louisiana
General Assembly, 2015). Similarly, the Utah General Assembly amended the Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure and the Government Records Access and Management Act by interpreting a
recording from a body-worn camera by a police officer as constituting a private record. This
classification does run contrary to the definition of “public record” under section 103 of the Utah
Code (Utah General Assembly, 2015). However, the Utah General Assembly repeals all other
existing laws in conflict with this new amendment. Consequentially, body-worn camera
recordings become an exception to the rule of what is to be considered a “public record” and
become classified as a private record.
Some states6 do not yet have any legislation that governs and regulates the use of bodyworn cameras. However, some police agencies have still initiated body-worn camera programs
despite the absence of appropriate legislation (see for example Cleveland Police Department
2015; Missoula Police Department, 2014).
However, not all states completely exempted body-worn camera recordings from public
records law requirements entirely (see Table 1). In some cases, the location where the recording
occurred affected whether or not it could be released to the public and exempting such scenarios
from public records requirements (see Table 1). In North Dakota, any image that was recorded
by a police officer with a body-worn camera that occurred in a private place becomes exempt
from public record requirements (North Dakota General Assembly, 2015). Individual privacy
becomes the key justification for this particular exemption. However, the North Dakota General

6

States that currently do not have any legislation governing body-worn cameras: Arkansas, Idaho, Montana, New York, Ohio,
Wisconsin, Wyoming
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Assembly does not define what constitutes a “private place” and leaves the term open to a broad
or restrictive interpretation by police agencies.
Although body-worn cameras are not explicitly purported to be a new police surveillance
device, the majority7 of the U.S. police agencies examined do not prohibit use of these devices
for surreptitious recordings. In the case of Nevada, existing state law does prohibit the use of
surreptitious electronic surveillance on public grounds. However, Bill 111 of the Nevada General
Assembly aimed at the governance of body-worn cameras, creates an exemption. “Sections 3 and
5 of this bill create an exception for peace officers employed by the Nevada Highway Patrol
wearing a portable event recording device from certain provisions relating to unlawful
surreptitious electronic surveillance” (Nevada General Assembly, 2015: 1). The justification for
this exemption becomes framed in the context that body-worn cameras do not constitute a covert
surveillance device with the purpose of surreptitious surveillance. Given the absence of any
consent requirements in Nevada, this amendment exempted body-worn cameras from electronic
surveillance laws and as such effectively eroded traditional principles and standards of law.
Consequentially, these devices can now be used for police surveillance without any legal
obstacles and as such befitting Ericson’s (2007) counter-law and surveillant assemblage
framework.
The previously mentioned exemptions are no doubt evidence for the presence of counterlaw in body-worn camera legislations. However, these exemptions are not the only way counterlaw is created. As explained earlier, inherent broadness and ambiguity is clearly present within
the newly enacted legislations that aim to govern how, where, and when body-worn cameras may
be operated. As explained earlier with the Gang Congregation Ordinance in Chicago, expansive

7 With the exception of Phoenix Police Department who prohibit the use of body-worn cameras to surreptitiously record
conversations of citizens and employees.
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interpretive and definitional limits of newly enacted legislation constitute a form of counter-law
(see Levi, 2009). In the case of antisocial behaviour ordinances, the lack of a proper legal
definition allows for a broad legal interpretation, which consequentially allows for an expansive
scope. For all the state legislations that were analyzed, they all show evidence of extreme
vagueness and ambiguity, much like the definitional vagueness of anti-social behaviour laws and
Gang Congregation Ordinance.
Interpretational broadness within these new laws becomes evident when considering how
body-worn camera recordings become categorized as evidentiary data. Miami is the only police
agency whose policy text clearly defines what constitutes evidentiary data. None of the other 31
police agencies analyzed for this thesis give any clear definitional or categorical guidelines.
Thus, no guideline at all is the norm. For Miami, evidentiary data becomes defined as “footage
of an incident or encounter that could prove useful for investigative purposes, such as a crime, an
arrest or citation, a search, a use of force incident, or a confrontational encounter with a member
of the public” (Miami Police Department, 2015: 2). The California General Assembly (2015) in
section 5(b) defines evidentiary data as “data of an incident or encounter that could prove useful
for investigative purposes, including, but not limited to, a crime, an arrest or citation, a search, a
use of force incident, or a confrontational encounter with a member of the public”. Although
most of the police agencies lack clear definitional guidelines, definitions like the one put forward
by California may filter down and adopted at the police agency level. The definition put forward
by the Miami Police Department is very similar to California’s. However, the California
legislature lists a particular set of circumstances in which a recording may be useful for an
investigation but it clearly states that the interpretive/definitional confines of “evidentiary data”
is not strictly limited to the listed categorizations. As such, the legislative interpretation of
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“evidentiary data” is intentionally left open. Not limiting what is to be considered “evidentiary
data” befits Ericson’s (2007a) notion of legal vagueness in his discussion of anti-social
behaviour laws. Consequentially, the absence of clearly defined limits allows for the possibility
of broad legal interpretation in how body-worn camera recordings may be used.
In California, the newly amended definitional confines of “evidentiary data” does not
only broaden how body-worn camera recordings may be used, but it also affects the retention
period of these recordings. When a body-worn camera recording becomes categorized as having
“evidentiary value”, it becomes governed by the specific state’s evidentiary laws (California
General Assembly, 2015; Utah General Assembly, 2015). The broad interpretive limits of what
can be considered as “evidentiary value” also extends the retention period limits. Under existing
state evidentiary laws, retention periods for recordings of investigative value are unlimited or
until all investigations involving that recording are concluded.

B) Canada
Body-worn camera programs are relatively recent in Canadian police services. Only a
few police services have started testing these devices or are currently doing so. Consequentially,
the legislation for body-worn cameras is also in its infancy. In fact, there is no legislation that is
directly aimed at the governance of body-worn cameras. In 2015, the Guidance for the Use of
BWC by Law Enforcement Authorities was published by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada. Currently, this is the only document that aims to guide how body-worn cameras
should be used and considers what law enforcement authorities should take into account when
implementing these devices. Privacy concerns are the biggest challenges to the implementation
of body-worn cameras (Hager, 2015; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2015).
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However, the acquisition of consent is not an obstacle to the operation of these devices because
Canadian citizens do not legally have the option to refuse consent when they come in contact
with an officer equipped with a body-worn camera. Moreover, informing citizens that a
recording is taking place is also not legally required by police officers. The Guidance explains
that police officers should make a reasonable effort to inform the public that officers are
equipped with body-worn cameras and that the interactions are being recorded (Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2015: 5). While there is a lowered expectation of privacy in a
public place, body-worn cameras may be engaged inside a private residence where privacy
becomes a significant issue. Although police accountability and transparency are the two of the
main goals of body-worn cameras, the absence of enforceable legislation regarding citizen
consent does not seem to address these aims.
Currently in Canada, none of the existing privacy legislation is in conflict with the
operation of body-worn cameras by police services. Given this, the need for counteracting
legislation to enable the operation of body-worn cameras is not required. There are imbedded
aspects of broadness and ambiguity within existing privacy legislation that allow body-worn
cameras to be operated by police services without any legal obstacles. Nevertheless, this still
illustrates tenets of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework. The legal broadness present in
existing legislation facilitates the use of body-worn cameras farther than their initially intended
purposes and thus allows for its incorporation in the surveillant assemblage.
Body-worn cameras do record personal information when an interaction occurs between
a police officer and a citizen. Consequentially, one particular provincial law that governs the use
of personal information is the Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
(herein referred to as FIPPA). Although these particular acts vary provincially, the sections that
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are of significance to the use of body-worn cameras are the same for all the provinces. I chose to
focus on Ontario freedom of information legislation as exemplary throughout this thesis.
According to the FIPPA, “personal information” means recorded information about an
identifiable individual. This encompasses things such as information relating to race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sexual orientation and marital status. It also includes
employment, medical and criminal histories, addresses, telephone numbers, and fingerprints.
Despite the very clear list of what personal information entails, the list itself encompasses a wide
range of information. Section 38(2) of the Act states that “no person shall collect personal
information on behalf of an institution unless the collection is expressly authorized by statute,
used for the purposes of law enforcement or necessary to the proper administration of a lawfully
authorized activity”. If, however the “personal information” is being collected for law
enforcement purposes, it becomes justified and lawful. Consequentially, the footage from bodyworn cameras falls under the category of “personal information” and the collection of such
information becomes justified and lawful because it is for the purpose of law enforcement.
Although existing provincial privacy legislation gives a very expansive definition of “personal
information”, it also provides an inadequate definition of “law enforcement”. According to
FIPPA, the notion of “law enforcement” is defined as any policing practices or investigations
that may lead to proceedings in a court. As such, the term “law enforcement” may include any
action intended to enforce an act or regulation passed by either provincial or federal government.
Nevertheless, this definition does not provide a clear understanding of what “law enforcement
purposes” actually entails and thus leaves it open to a very expansive interpretation.
At the federal level, the Privacy Act is the highest level of privacy legislation in Canada
and its purpose is to protect the privacy rights of individuals with respect to personal information
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about themselves held by a government institution. The Privacy Act relies on the same definition
of “personal information” and “law enforcement” as the Ontario Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act. Although, the main point of the Act is to protect individual privacy,
law enforcement authorities are given many exemptions under this Act. Section 4 of the Privacy
Act explicitly prohibits the collection of personal information by a government authority. The
only exceptional circumstance to Section 4 that justifies this is if the collection of personal
information is directly related to an operating program or activity of a government institution.
The Act also extends the limits of how personal information may be used and when such
information can be disclosed by law enforcement purposes. Under normal circumstances,
disclosure of personal information by a government institution is prohibited. However, Section
8(2)(e) exempts the enforcement of this rule if personal information is required for the purpose
of enforcing any law in Canada or carrying out a lawful investigation. The Privacy Act also
enables inter-agency sharing of body-worn camera footage if the recording contains evidence
that may be needed for a lawful investigation.
The main purpose of privacy legislation like the FIPPA and Privacy Act is to protect
individual privacy and the collection of personal information by government authorities.
However, the terminology used in these acts is intentionally very broad and vague. “Personal
information” is given a very expansive definition while “law enforcement” is left ambiguous
under broad categorical terms. According to Lippert and Walby (2013: 10), the Privacy Act is
considered semi-voluntary and as a result requires compliance on part of the governed. The
collection of personal information for criminalization purposes becomes justified as long as
privacy legislation is invoked (Lippert and Walby, 2013: 17). For example, CCTV signage that
invokes privacy law effectively authorizes CCTV surveillance in particular areas (Lippert and
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Walby, 2013: 18). Similarly, the use of body-worn cameras becomes authorized because they
invoke privacy legislation, specifically the notion that they are being used for law enforcement
purposes. This possible interpretation of these acts extend police powers in how they can use the
personal information gathered through body-worn cameras, much like anti-social laws extended
police powers to pre-empt people from congregating in groups (see Ericson, 2007a: 164). The
inherent ambiguity and semi-voluntary nature of these privacy laws act as an enabling
mechanism for the extension of surveillance.
Problems of legal broadness and ambiguity in Canada are not unique to body-worn
cameras. Hier (2010) identifies similar problems with the rise of CCTV monitoring programs in
Canada. There is an inconsistency in CCTV programs across Canada that is largely due to
ambiguities and incoherence stemming from privacy protection principles. Hier (2010) explains
that these privacy principles are unclear and incomprehensive which consequentially allows for
numerous interpretations and adaptations of the program. Although body-worn camera programs
have only been initiated by a handful of Canadian police services, program inconsistencies do
exist as exemplified by the Calgary Police Service’s attempt to integrate facial recognition
technology with their body-worn camera program. Hier (2010) explains that CCTV advocates
often cherry-picked which privacy protection principles to emphasize and which ones to ignore.
Similarly, the legality of Calgary’s facial recognition integration becomes emphasized as being
within the confines of the existing provincial privacy legislation because it serves a law
enforcement purpose. As mentioned earlier, existing privacy legislation does not adequately
define what “law enforcement” entails. It collapses it under the broad umbrella term of
“policing” and “investigations”. Consequentially, this definitional incoherence and legal
ambiguity allows for various adaptations and uses of body-worn camera programs that are
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deemed to be within the confines of acceptable legal police practices, but nevertheless extend the
surveillant assemblage.
Public police are considered to be a public institution and as such, members of the public
may request access to body-worn camera recordings under the Ontario FIPPA. Section 1(a)(i) of
the FIPPA addresses that one of the purposes of this Act is “to provide a right of access to
information under the control of institutions in accordance with principles that, information
should be available to the public”. Individuals may request access to part of a body-worn camera
recording where their own person was recorded. Essentially, the main purpose of the FIPPA is to
promote transparency and access to public information. However, there are numerous
exemptions that are embedded into existing freedom of information laws where a public
institution may reasonably refuse to disclose a request for access. Section 14(1) of the FIPPA
lists numerous exemptions that are reasonable justifications to deny a request for access.
Disclosure may be refused if it would interfere with law enforcement matter, interfere with an
investigation by law enforcement, endanger safety of an officer, or reveal investigative
techniques. These are only a few of the reasons why disclosure may be denied under Section
14(1) of the FIPPA. The list is very extensive and seemingly exhaustive because it covers a wide
range of possibilities where request to access may be denied. Not only are these exemptions very
broad and vague, but also they allow for interpretive flexibility in denying requests to access
body-worn camera recordings. Although in Canada freedom of information laws were not
amended with the advent of body-worn cameras, the existing exemptions do operate within
Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework because much like the antisocial behaviour laws, these
exemptions are also intentionally very broad. Consequentially, these exemptions run contrary to
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the supposed aim of body-worn camera programs in general, which is to create greater police
accountability and transparency.
The Canada Evidence Act indirectly governs the use of body-worn camera recordings
when they become categorized as evidence. Although the Act does not directly address when
body-worn camera recordings can become categorized as evidence, it does govern its use when
the recordings become evidence. When these recordings become categorized as evidence their
retention periods increase to an indefinite amount of time or until the investigation is concluded
(Edmonton Police Service, 2015b). However, none of the existing laws, including the Canada
Evidence Act, directly address when body-worn camera recordings become categorized as
evidence.
Police services that initiated pilot projects provide some scenarios when recordings are
assessed as having evidentiary value. Such scenarios include sexual assault or domestic violence
investigations (Edmonton Police Service, 2015a; Calgary Police Service, 2015a). However, these
scenarios are also left intentionally broad under the wide encompassing umbrella term of
“criminal investigations”. When and to what extent a body-worn camera may be used during a
sexual assault or domestic violence investigation is largely left up to discretion of the officer
(Calgary Police Service, 2015a; Edmonton Police Service, 2015a). The interpretive broadness in
what can be considered as evidence allows for extensive uses of body-worn camera recordings
that go beyond their initial purpose.

III. Counter-Law II: Surveillant Assemblage
The second part of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework is counter-law II or the
surveillant assemblage. Much like counter-law I where new laws are enacted to erode traditional
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principles, the surveillant assemblage takes a similar form in which new elements are constantly
being into the existing assemblage which in many cases result in the erosion existing standards
of law considered obstacles in the pre-emption of imagined sources of harm (Ericson, 2007a:
24). Body-worn cameras can be effectively considered a new element of Ericson’s (2007a)
surveillant assemblage. Although the main purpose of these devices is to monitor police conduct
and increase accountability. There are numerous instances where these devices have been used
for purposes beyond merely monitoring conduct. This extension of their use allows these devices
to be incorporated as new part the surveillant assemblage that erode existing standards of law, as
already demonstrated in the previous sections.

A) United States
As discussed in the previous section, privacy and public records legislations were
amended to exempt body-worn cameras from certain requirements under these laws.
Specifically, regarding two-consent states, amended legislations exempted body-worn cameras
from this requirement, allowing officers to initiate recording without the need to obtain consent
from the citizen. This exemption undoubtedly befits Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law I because a
traditional legal standard is suspended and removed from the legal order. However, these
exemptions also allow body-worn cameras to become incorporated as a new element of the
existing surveillant assemblage.
Amongst the already mentioned purposes of increasing transparency, accountability and
monitoring police conduct, body-worn cameras are also considered to be an invaluable tool in
the collection of evidence. In the U.S., most police agencies initiating body-worn camera
programs, state in their policy text that one of purposes of these devices will be to collect
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evidence for use in criminal investigations (see Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,
2015; Los Angeles Police Department, 2015). Some police agencies explain that these devices
will be used to assist in the documentation of suspected crime or to capture crimes in-progress
(see Denver Police Department, 2015; Mills Police Department, 2015). Most police agencies
allow for a significant level of discretion in what situations are deemed appropriate for bodyworn cameras to be used (see Table 2). Atlanta Police Department (2014: 1) states in their policy
text that body-worn camera recordings may be used as evidence in the prosecution of criminal
offenses, departmental investigations, and any other situations, which the department deems
appropriate.
None of the analyzed police agencies from the U.S. extensively detail what the collection
of evidence through body-worn cameras might entail, or the types of incidents that may be
considered to be of evidentiary value. In fact, some U.S. police agencies state that all body-worn
camera data may be categorized as evidence (see Miami Police Department, 2015). Nevertheless,
the purpose of collecting evidence is the first sign of body-worn cameras being used as a possible
surveillance device.
As a surveillance device, body-worn cameras are very unique. They are very flexible and
mobile and as a result their surveillance capacities are much more extensive than other existing
camera surveillance technologies. By attaching a body-worn camera onto an officer, the
surveillance capacities of this device are greatly extended (Ramirez, 2014). Although officers
equipped with body-worn cameras tend to be selectively distributed in specific neighbourhoods,
anyone can become a subject of law enforcement surveillance simply being in the field of view
of the cameras. As Johnson (2014: 9) explains, “the police are characterised by their surveillance
of the civil population. They are empowered to see everything; nothing should be too small or
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inconsequential enough to escape their gaze”. As a surveillance device, body-worn cameras
empower police officers to monitor every citizen they interact with.
The unique mobility of body-worn cameras creates spatial implications unseen before
with other surveillance devices. The inside of peoples’ homes is an area with the largest
expectation of privacy where police powers are significantly reduced. Under normal
circumstances, police surveillance inside a person’s home is considered unlawful. However,
body-worn cameras become an exception to this rule because in the majority of the states these
devices can be kept on when an officer is interacting with a citizen inside their homes. If the
officer’s presence is lawful, body-worn camera recordings may proceed inside the home (see
Denver Police Department, 2015: 3; Louisville Metropolitan Police Department, 2015: 323;
University of Tennessee Police Department, 2015: 3). By allowing body-worn cameras to be
used inside of people’s homes, its surveillance potential is greatly extended.
Biometric technology is becoming more commonplace with camera surveillance in
general. Biometrics entails the use of biological information for the purposes of identification
and verification (Magnet, 2011). Many U.S. police agencies have already started using facial
recognition software to scan CCTV camera footage and crosscheck them with existing
searchable databases (Mateescu, Rosenblat and Boyd, 2015). Combining digitized CCTV
systems with searchable computer databases, the intensity of surveillance greatly increases
(Ericson, 2007a: 52). Although biometric technology is already being used with CCTV cameras,
incorporating biometric software with body-worn cameras is new. None of the examined bodyworn camera program policies limit the use of biometrics and real-time data analytics. However,
facial recognition systems have already started being tested on body-worn cameras (see Body
Worn Video Steering Group, 2015; Gotfredson, 2014). Interestingly, none of the amended

41

legislative acts make the use of biometrics in conjunction with body-worn cameras illegal.
Recent advances in technology however are making it possible to extract biometric information
from video footage. The close up-images that body-worn cameras record provide the ideal
scenario for the extraction of facial information through biometric systems (Mateescu, Rosenblat
and Boyd, 2015). It is only a matter of time before such invasive biometric extraction practice
become common place with body-worn cameras. Studies are already testing body-worn cameras
with facial recognition software. These devices are being tested in real-life conditions and during
law enforcement activities (Al-Obaydy and Sellahewa, 2011).
The analysis of manufacturer websites and marketing materials revealed that camera
manufacturers are increasingly marketing more sophisticated body-worn cameras that
incorporate various data analytics and real time analysis (see Axon, 2016; Integrys, 2016; Reveal
Media, 2016). These cameras are specifically being marketed as being highly efficient in data
collection and security. Reveal Media is currently marketing their RS2-X2 body-worn cameras
as being one of the most efficient cameras in data collection and management. Real time
software allows the officer to categorize recordings as evidentiary right on the spot (Reveal
Media, 2016). Other manufacturers also focus on efficiency in data management by combining
numerous sources of video evidence into one single repository. The Verus Evidence
Management system enables recordings from body-worn cameras to be synchronized with other
video surveillance to procure a time-accurate recreation of events from multiple angles (Warner,
2015). Attempts to incorporate body-worn cameras with other video surveillance devices in a
synchronized video management software is evidence for the extension of the surveillant
assemblage. Such synchronization allows for efficient data retrieval and analysis in searchable
databases. This is not a new idea within police institutions. In the past, police services have
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looked for new ways to integrate and synchronize their numerous computer systems and
databases. This was exemplified by the ongoing efforts of law enforcement authorities to
effectively synchronize intelligence databases (see Chermak et al., 2013; Haggerty and Ericson,
2000; Taylor and Russell, 2012).
Most of the U.S. police agencies analyzed already engage in video data management and
analysis (see Denver Police Department, 2015; Las Vegas Police Department, 2015; Seattle
Police Department, 2015). Most policy texts state that body-worn camera recordings are to be
uploaded to evidence.com. This website, which is managed by a company called Axon, allows
for efficient retrieval, analysis and interagency sharing (Axon, 2016). According to Axon (2016),
this website allows for interconnectedness among different police agencies through information
sharing, which is ultimately justified by possible reductions in crime. Although the policy texts
do not explain when body-worn camera recordings may be shared with other governmental
agencies, state legislation does allow for this to occur with considerable discretion. Section 3(s)
of bill no. 248 of the Florida General Assembly (2015) states that “a body camera recording may
be disclosed by a law enforcement agency, to another governmental agency in the furtherance of
its official duties and responsibilities”. Cloud storage of recordings and interagency sharing of
information extends the uses of body-worn camera recordings within the surveillant assemblage.
Incorporating biometric technology with body-worn cameras falls beyond the originally
stated purpose of these devices being used for monitoring police conduct. Incorporating real time
analytics and facial recognition technology with body-worn cameras is undoubtedly evidence of
function creep. The notion of function creep entails the gradual widening of use of a technology
beyond the originally intended purpose (see for example Backman, 2012). With the evidence of
function creep, body-worn cameras are becoming a new element of the existing surveillant
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assemblage. Although Ericson (2007a: 24) explains that with the development of new
surveillance networks and infrastructures, traditional standards of law are often eliminated, it is
not the case for body-worn cameras regarding their surveillance potential. Existing legislation
does not expressly prohibit the use of body-worn cameras as a police surveillance device or the
incorporation of biometrics and real time video analytics. Consequentially, the use of body-worn
cameras can easily be extended beyond simply for the purposes of monitoring police conduct.
The absence surveillance governing legislation in the case of body-worn cameras, allows these
devices to be used for citizen surveillance without much legal obstacle.
Although absent of legal challenges, body-worn camera programs are not without social
consequences. Combining body-worn cameras with searchable databases based on biometrics
show the possibility of social sorting. Surveillance a social sorting relies on particular categories
by which personal information is categorized specifically with the intent to manage certain
populations. The majority of existing surveillance devices equipped with biometric technology,
all rely on searchable databases (Lyon, 2001). This would be no different with body-worn
cameras. Body-worn cameras paired with facial recognition technology could easily become like
police automated license plate scanner, constantly scanning faces, categorizing and matching
them with databases (see Harvard Law Review, 2015; Warren et al., 2013). In the absence of
effective legislation to regulate its surveillant limits, body-worn cameras run the danger of
becoming yet another tool for police surveillance and social sorting.
Body-worn cameras are primarily intended for use by uniformed patrol officers.
However, according to the IACP (2014), plainclothes officers may be issued body-worn cameras
as well. Equipping plainclothes officers with these devices creates new social and legal
consequences. The examined camera policy texts from the U.S. police agencies are primarily
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aimed at the governance of body-worn cameras equipped by uniformed officers. The New
Orleans Police Department (2015) policy text states that plainclothes officers may be issued
body-worn cameras. Existing state legislation on body-worn cameras does not address the use of
these devices by plainclothes officers. Body-worn cameras are generally intended for overt use,
meaning that they cannot be hidden or out of sight. However, equipping plainclothes officers
with these devices changes their meaning entirely. Officers wearing plain clothes instead of a
uniform signify a shift in the meaning of their image. The plain clothes are intended to mask the
image that they are police officers. Equipping these officers with body-worn cameras changes
the conceptualization of the camera towards a covert device. Although these devices may still be
used to monitor conduct, plainclothes officers do not interact with members of the public to the
same extent as uniformed officers do. Also, plainclothes officers tend to be more involved in
investigative and detective duties, thus changing the context of the body-worn camera recordings
considerably. Given the absence of governing state legislation and appropriate police policy
texts, equipping plainclothes officers with these cameras undoubtedly befits Ericson’s (2007a)
surveillant assemblage. Although equipping uniformed officers with body-worn cameras already
constitutes an extension of the surveillant assemblage, plainclothes officers’ use of these devices
extends this even further.

B) Canada
The Canadian police services examined in this study also state that a purpose of their
body-worn camera programs is to collect evidence. Victoria, BC was the first police service in
North America to test body-worn cameras through a pilot project. Their policy text clearly states
that the purpose of this technology was not surveillance or deterrence, but rather to capture the
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“best evidence” of criminal behaviour for court purposes through video technology (Victoria
Police Service, 2010: 8). During the pilot project, personal information was collected as
evidentiary data to be used in prosecution. Interestingly, the enhancement of police
accountability and transparency was not emphasized at all. In fact, the policy text states that
body-worn cameras were adopted with hopes of increasing the effectiveness of information
gathering for law enforcement purposes and not accountability or transparency. Victoria Police
Service (2010) explain their body-worn cameras are not considered surveillance devices but
instead are investigative tools used to gather the best evidence possible, a distinction that is
entirely unclear. During their pilot project, body-worn cameras were supposedly only used to
record evidentiary data useful for investigations and prosecution. The Calgary Police Service
(2015a) and Edmonton Police Service (2015b) both emphasize the use of body-worn cameras for
investigative purposes. Calgary Police Service (2015b) lists the collection of evidence as the first
aim of the body-worn camera pilot project. Similarly, to Victoria, Calgary also explains that
body-worn cameras are being used for providing additional evidence during prosecution and also
improving evidence documentation. It is evident that the collection of evidence is a major
objective of body-worn cameras programs in Canada.
Canadian police services allow for considerable discretion about when body-worn
cameras may be turned on. Amherstburg Police Service (2015) lists numerous situations where
body-worn cameras must be turned on; however, it does advise an officer to turn on cameras
during all investigative contacts with the public for purposes of evidence gathering. Calgary
Police Service (2015a) emphasizes that cameras should be turned on during all domestic
violence and sexual assault investigations. The aim is to capture as much evidence as possible
and witness statements. Although officers are advised to be sensitive to privacy concerns when it
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comes to recording the inside of a private residence, there is still considerable discretion given to
officers. The policy texts clearly outline when body-worn cameras should be used inside a
private dwelling. By invoking provincial privacy legislation, police services become authorized
to use body-worn cameras for very extensive purposes, including citizen surveillance.
Although unaddressed by U.S. police agencies, retention periods are of significant
importance in Canadian police body-worn cameras pilot projects. There is considerable variance
in how long recordings can be kept. Amherstburg Police Service (2015) states that body-worn
camera recordings shall be retained for 6 months, unless deemed to be of evidentiary value, at
which point the retention period increases. Although it is not stated in their policy text, retention
periods increase to indefinite if recordings become categorized as evidence. Similarly, Calgary
Police Service (2015c) states that body-worn camera recordings will be automatically deleted
after 13 months, unless they become categorized as evidence. Evidentiary retention periods are
also indefinite in Alberta. Currently there are no laws that regulate the retention period of bodyworn camera recordings. As a result, police services allocate retention periods as they see fit,
often dependent on available storage. Retention periods become of concern when considering the
ambiguities involved with what content of body-worn camera recordings may be categorized as
evidence.
On a given police service; only a certain number of officers are equipped with body-worn
cameras. It would cost a considerable amount of resources to equip all the sworn members of a
large police service. The body-worn camera pilot project initiated by the Toronto Police Service,
lasting from May 2015 to June 2016 rolled out 100 cameras (Mehta, 2015). To effectively test
these devices, the police service plans to rotate them throughout various units and analyze their
use in varying contexts. In Toronto, these devices are intended to be used by the Rapid Response
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Team, Traffic Services, 55 Division Primary Response Unit and the 43 Division Community
Response Unit. According to the TPS, these units were chosen because of their frequent contact
with the community. Similarly, in Edmonton body-worn cameras were selectively distributed in
certain areas. Although frequency of contact with the community was a major deciding factor in
where cameras were distributed, the concentration of cameras in specific area exposed certain
groups to more intensified surveillance. Officers with body-worn cameras were heavily
concentrated in the area of the West Edmonton Mall. This area includes various shopping and
entertainment attractions. It also includes numerous concert venues and bars where alcohol and
potentially other substances may be consumed. Although this area has a heavy concentration of
CCTV cameras, infusing body-worn cameras into this context would provide supplemental data
that CCTV cameras may miss (Edmonton Police Service, 2015a). This selective distribution of
cameras reveals that one of their purpose is surveillance. Risky populations and undesirables
often congregate in nightlife districts, such as the West Edmonton Mall area. As a result, these
areas tend to be heavily securitized and surveilled (see for example Palmer and Warren, 2013).
Ericson (2007a: 169) explains that targeted populations are often those deemed to be dangerous.
Given this, concentrating body-worn cameras in the West Edmonton Mall area is largely for the
purpose of watching and managing risky populations. Consequentially, body-worn cameras now
become a police surveillance device, which befits Ericson’s (2007a) surveillant assemblage
model.
During their pilot project, Edmonton Police Service (2015a) decided to equip its Traffic
Impaired Driving Countermeasures Unit (IDCU) with body-worn cameras. The IDCU
coordinates and participates in roadside checkstops aimed at targeting impaired driving.
Roadside checkstops may be problematic in and of themselves given that their constitutionality
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remains in contention. Nevertheless, equipping officers with cameras placed at these checkstops
creates further social and legal issues. Although there is a high frequency of community contact
within this context, the duration of contact is very low. As a result, body-worn cameras in this
context may not be present for the sole purpose monitoring officer conduct; rather their main
objective would be to collect information on a risky population.
None of the Canadian police services make reference to real time video analytics or
biometrics in their body-worn camera policy texts. Although implementing biometrics with
body-worn cameras does raise numerous privacy concerns, police services in Canada have very
broad authority under the provincial FIPPA to collect, use and disclose personal information for
law enforcement purposes (Doll and Sosiak, 2014). Calgary Police Service stated that only the
names of suspects involved with criminal matters would be entered into the CPS facial
recognition database. Regardless of the proposed limitation in what names get entered into the
facial recognition database, the body-worn cameras could indiscriminately record everyone.
Aside from the privacy implications, there are concerns around the accuracy and reliability of the
facial recognition software. As Magnet (2011: 29) explains, biometric technology is rampant
with technological failures of unreliability and inconsistency and these failures tend to harm
disadvantaged groups disproportionately.
The selective distribution of body-worn cameras in certain areas and the adoption of
biometric technology is evidence of function creep. Concentrating cameras in specific
neighbourhoods is part of police profiling. Undesirables and other risky populations frequent
these areas. Incorporating facial recognition technology within this context would undoubtedly
extend the proposed objectives of body-worn camera programs. These devices now become used
as a precautionary tool for surveillance and risk management, which befit Ericson’s (2007a)
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surveillant assemblage model. Although the occurrence of counter-law I regarding body-worn
cameras is not effectively illustrated in existing Canadian legislation, existing legal vagueness
and more importantly the absence of appropriate camera legislation does allow body-worn
cameras to be incorporated as a new element of the existing surveillant assemblage.

IV. Encountering Resistance as part of the Surveillant Assemblage
The numerous legislative amendments in the U.S. created numerous exemptions that
facilitated the use of these devices, which does befit the notion of the surveillant assemblage.
Wilkinson and Lippert (2012: 312) explain that the criminalizing process brought about by the
surveillant assemblage brings with it various forms of resistance. As body-worn cameras become
part of the larger surveillant assemblage, their implementation also encounters various forms of
resistance.
Although an increasing number of police services are adopting body-worn camera
programs, there is considerable negativity surrounding these devices, mostly from officers forced
to wear them. Many veteran police officers tend to dislike body-worn cameras, often labeling
these devices as just another extra tool to worry about (Edmonton Police Service 2015b).
Wilkinson and Lippert (2012) explain that increasing police workload can be considered a type
of resistance to the otherwise seamless progression of the surveillant assemblage. In the case of
body-worn cameras, the police officer has to upload the recordings from these devices onto a
static or cloud storage unit. Front line officers may spend up to 3 hours uploading and tagging
body-worn camera recordings from a 10-hour shift (Casey, 2016). This places an extra burden on
police workload that can be conceptualized as a form of resistance.
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Resistance within the surveillant assemblage may include various organizational,
technical and social processes that prevent the flow of video images (Bogard, 2006: 98).
Although the daily use of body-worn cameras places an extra burden on police workload, police
resistance towards these devices can also be conceptualized within the notion of workplace
surveillance. The Edmonton Police Service (2015b) reveals various different opinions about
body-worn cameras coming from the officers who tested them during the pilot project. Although
most do approve of body-worn cameras in general, they disagree with having to wear them
because it may negatively affect their behaviour. As a veteran EPS police officer explains:
If I forget about the BWV and swear or am more aggressive in my attitude it concerns me
afterwards. I think I shouldn’t have done that and am afraid of complaints (Edmonton
Police Service, 2015b: 47).
Some officers may forget about the presence of the body-worn camera and as a result use
language during the citizen interaction that may not be deemed appropriate.
Officer safety is one of the key aspects that is heavily discussed when police services
consider the adoption of body-worn cameras. The presence of the camera may affect how police
officers act in certain situations and possibly jeopardizing their safety. As one EPS police officer
reveals:
The activated BWV made me more hesitate to take control of the situation other than
verbally. For example, there was a subject who began to gain the upper hand. Attempted
to walk away in handcuffs. Eventually I got bitten by the subject and used level two use
of force. Hesitation is an officer safety concern. Hesitation is an officer safety concern
(Edmonton Police Service, 2015b: 47).
Being overly concerned with the presence of the body-worn camera and its surveillant effects
may lead officers to act differently in certain situations and thus it could make them less effective
in some contexts (Edmonton Police Service, 2015b: 47).
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Officer resistance towards body-worn cameras become especially obvious when there are
other responders on a particular scene whose activities may be recorded by another officer’s
body-worn camera. Other officers or first responders may become concerned if a colleague has a
body-worn camera. As an EPS officer reveals, there is a considerable level of negativity towards
the presence of body-worn cameras equipped on other constables:
But members don’t like it. They don’t like change and there is a lot of negativity towards
it. I can tell other members it is on but they will not necessarily be as aware of it. Or they
can change their behaviour and don’t do what they should because of the BWC, don’t use
force or change how they police (Edmonton Police Service, 2015b: 48).
The concern for the presence of body-worn cameras from colleagues can also be framed to be
part of the larger concern for workplace surveillance because inadvertently now their activities
may also be scrutinized in the aftermath of an incident.
Officer concern for workplace surveillance and the increasing police workloads pose
considerable resistance to the deployment of body-worn cameras and the subsequent extension of
the surveillant assemblage. However, Wilkinson and Lippert (2012) explain that technological
limitations may also inhibit the spread of the surveillant assemblage. Although video recording
technology improved considerably since the rise of CCTV cameras, technological limitations
still exist that can be conceptualized as barriers to the spread of the surveillant assemblage.
Given that body-worn cameras are attached to an officer, these devices rely on battery life that is
often very limited, in some cases only lasting 3 hours (see Integrys, 2016; Reveal Media, 2016).
This limited battery life can be framed as a form of resistance because it essentially limits the
duration of body-worn camera recordings.
Much like with CCTV cameras, body-worn cameras are limited in their field of view.
Although body-worn cameras are unique in their mobility because they are attached to an officer,
they are nevertheless limited on what they record. The direction in which an officer is facing is
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essentially what a body-worn camera records. Although the point of view of the officer may
change abruptly, the camera only records the direction the officer is facing and thus leaving out
surrounding context (see Force Science Institute, 2014). This limitation can also be
conceptualized as a technical form of resistance because it limits the collection of information by
body-worn cameras and the subsequent extension of the surveillant assemblage.
Lastly, storage limitations pose significant challenges to the retention of body-worn
camera recordings. Although technological advancements allow body-worn cameras to store a
considerable amount of recording data, technological limitations of cloud storage become
challenging (see Axon, 2016; Reveal Media, 2016). The majority of the police agencies with
body-worn camera programs that I have analyzed rely on cloud storage units (see for example
Phoenix Police Department, 2015; Rialto Police Department, 2015; Seattle Police Department,
2015). A cloud unit is still a finite storage unit and thus it still limits the amount of data that can
be stored on it. In most cases old recordings need to be deleted to create space for the newer
ones. Storage limitations can be considered a type of resistance to the spread of body-worn
cameras within the surveillant assemblage because it inhibits information flow (see Wilkinson
and Lippert, 2012). Finite storage only allows for a specific amount of information from bodyworn cameras to flow through a police institution thus limiting the extent of the surveillant
assemblage itself.
Resistance to body-worn cameras may not only come from the police institution itself,
technical forms of resistance such limited battery life, point of view, and storage limitations also
pose barriers. As mentioned earlier, the criminalizing process through the surveillant assemblage
is filled with obstacles (see Wilkinson and Lippert, 2012). Even with the numerous legislative
amendments and exemptions intended to facilitate the use of body-worn cameras, the above
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mentioned examples of resistance make the integration of these devices within the existing
surveillant assemblage “less than seamless” (see Wilkinson and Lippert, 2012: 312). I return to
the significance of this resistance below.

6. CONCLUSIONS
Drawing on Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework, this thesis sought answers to two
questions: how and to what extent are body-worn camera programs a form of counter-law? How
and to what extent is Ericson’s counter-law framework in need of refinements in light of bodyworn camera programs. To effectively answer the first question, I will summarize the results of
this thesis to discuss how and to what extent each aspect of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law
framework is reflected in the discourse. To effectively answer the second question, I will
summarize different parts of this thesis that did not directly befit Ericson’s (2007a) original
framework of counter-law, but show evidence for part of it. I conclude by discussing necessary
refinements to Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework regarding body-worn camera programs
and its effects.

I. How and To What Extent are Body-Worn Camera Programs a Form of Counter-Law?
Body-worn camera programs are found to be a form of counter-law because their
representations in the existing discourse befit the aspects of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law
framework. The politics of uncertainty is a crucial component of risk management, represented
throughout the counter-law framework. According to Ericson (2007a), uncertainties with no
calculable price become the focus of a precautionary response. The rise of body-worn camera
programs in Canada and the U.S. befit Ericson’s (2007a) conceptualization of a precautionary
response. In the aftermath of the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson, Missouri and the death of
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Eric Garner in New York City, body-worn cameras became the focal point of discussion on how
to deal with the uncertainties of police misconduct and brutality. Following these events, public
opinion of the police, especially amongst African Americans, plummeted. The growing
widespread lack of trust in police amongst the public poses a significant level of risk to the
legitimacy of the police institution itself (Hawdon, 2008; Tyler et al. 2014). As such, body-worn
cameras became portrayed as the tool that will significantly enhance police accountability and
transparency. These devices would supposedly also achieve considerable reductions in unwanted
citizen complaints and save police agencies significant amounts of resources that would
otherwise be spent in civil lawsuits. Ericson (2007a) suggests that the politics of uncertainty
leads to enormous expenditures on risk assessment and management that reveal the limits of risk
based reasoning and

intensify uncertainty.

Body-worn camera programs befit the

conceptualization of a precautionary tool because of the overwhelming monetary costs of these
programs and the exaggerated response. Due to the absence of appropriate research, it is
uncertain whether these devices can indeed increase police accountability and transparency or
reduce complaints. Such an absence of conclusive research intensifies levels of uncertainty. With
police legitimacy being challenged in the aftermath of seemingly increasing incidents of police
brutality, body-worn camera programs become the precautionary response to increasing levels of
uncertainty.
With the rise of body-worn camera programs across the U.S., existing laws were heavily
amended to exempt body-worn cameras from certain legal requirements. Parts of the privacy
legislation, such as the two-consent requirement in certain states, posed difficulties to the
operation of body-worn cameras because citizens would often refuse to be recorded. Based on
Ericson’s (2007a) conceptualizations, the two-consent requirements can be considered a
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traditional standard of law that stood in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of harm. For
body-worn cameras to be used freely, amendments were made that exempted these devices from
the two-consent requirements. These exemptions befit Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law framework
because they ultimately eroded existing standards of law.
Under existing public records law in the U.S., body-worn camera recordings are to be
considered public information. However, certain states amended their public records law by
exempting these recordings from public records disclosure requirements and as such limit public
access to these recordings. These amendments to public records legislation also befit Ericson’s
(2007a) counter-law framework because they intended to counteract existing standards of law.
These exemptions also go against the proposed aims of body-worn camera programs in general,
which is to enhance police accountability and transparency. By exempting body-worn camera
recordings from public records disclosure requirement, transparency does not occur. Similarly,
police accountability becomes a difficult objective to accomplish.
Aside from these proposed aims of increasing accountability and transparency, these
body-worn cameras can also be used for the collection of evidence. Dependent on what the
camera recorded, some recordings may be categorized as having evidentiary value. However, it
is unclear what types of recording may be categorized as such. Police body-worn camera policy
texts do not provide clear guidelines; in many cases broadening interpretation to the point of
anything that can be considered useful in an investigation. Similarly, legislative amendments are
also vague and only address the use of body-worn camera recordings after it becomes evidence,
they do not clearly address the process by which the categorization itself is decided. The existing
broadness within these discourses befits Ericson’s (2007a) because it allows for the scope of
body-worn cameras to be expanded. Ericson (2007a: 160) explains that antisocial behaviour has
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never been given a proper legal definition. This broadness provides a much more expansive
scope for whatever may be defined or interpreted as problematic behaviour. The absence of clear
legal or policy guidelines to what types of body-worn camera recordings can be considered
evidence, allow for a very expansive use of these devices.
In the U.S., state legislations were heavily amended to allow body-worn cameras to be
used in areas where otherwise they would be considered unlawful, such as a private residence.
Policy discourses reveal that police agencies in the U.S. give a significant degree of discretion to
individual officers to decide when to initiate body-worn camera recordings. Furthermore, the
amended legislations back up this high level of police discretion by making the use of body-worn
cameras lawful in areas where their use would otherwise be challenged by privacy rights. Police
become empowered to use these devices to their discretion when they see fit. As mentioned
earlier, police are empowered to see everything (Johnson, 2014: 9). Allowing body-worn
cameras to be operated unhindered without any legal implications allows for these devices to be
integrated as a new component in the existing surveillant assemblage. According to Ericson
(2007a), new elements are constantly being added to the surveillant assemblage that often times
result in the erosion of traditional standards and principles of law that pose an obstacle to preemption. Body-worn camera programs befit the framework of the surveillant assemblage,
because the amended legislations allow these devices to be exempted from certain requirements
and thus operate unhindered.
The integration of biometric technology with body-worn camera programs highlights
how these devices are a new part of the surveillant assemblage. In the U.S., none of the
examined police agencies adopted any biometric technology with their body-worn camera
programs. However, none of the program policy texts or legislative amendments makes the
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integration of biometrics with body-worn cameras unlawful. Similarly, in Canada, the Calgary
Police Service integrated facial recognition technology with their body-worn camera programs. It
is unclear how the integration of facial recognition technology helps with police accountability
and transparency. Nevertheless, the integration of biometrics does befit Ericson’s (2007a: 52)
surveillant assemblage. As Ericson (2007a) explains, the integration of digitized CCTV systems
with computer databases results in the intensification of surveillance, which allows for the
identification of people through their data doubles. To operate biometric technology, searchable
databases are required where scanned faces are matched with data doubles. Integrating facial
recognition technology with body-worn cameras also relies on searchable computer databases.
Similarly, to the digitized CCTV systems, the surveillance potential of body-worn cameras are
greatly intensified in this process, allowing for the surveillant assemblage to take root.

II. How and To What Extent is Ericson’s Counter-Law Framework in need of refinements in
light of Body-Worn Camera Programs?
Counter-law does not always manifest itself in obvious ways. Ericson (2007a: 208)
argues that even with anti-social behaviour legislation, the laws are written to be used differently
dependent on the local context of uncertainty. The counter-law regime is not an unstoppable
monolithic process in and of itself. There is considerable variation across its manifestations.
Ericson (2007a: 208) calls for comparative future research that extends and modifies his counterlaw framework. Although I did not compare body-worn camera programs across different police
agencies between Canada and the U.S., my analysis reveals variations across how counter-law is
operationalized in body-worn camera programs within these two respective countries. Although
each of the states I have analyzed amended parts of their legislation to facilitate the use of body-
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worn cameras through legal exemptions, there is considerable variation across each state. These
states possess a considerable amount of autonomy when it comes to legislative decision-making
and this is undoubtedly illustrated through the variations in legislative amendments regarding
body-worn camera programs. In some states, legislative amendments did not alter existing
legislation to a considerable degree to facilitate the use of body-worn cameras (see
Massachusetts General Assembly, 2015). Currently, Massachusetts remains one of a few states
where officers equipped with body-worn cameras are legally obliged to obtain consent from a
citizen, if practicable, before a recording can be initiated. Most of the other states I analyzed
amended this consent requirement by creating an exemption for body-worn cameras. In some
cases, an officer is not even required to notify a citizen when a body-worn camera recording is
initiated. For example, the California General Assembly (2015) amended its two-consent laws by
exempting body-worn cameras from these requirements. Exemptions were also created to allow
these devices to be used in private spaces and to limit public access to recordings through public
records legislation. These legislative amendments by the state of California illustrate the
presence of counter-law and its intent to “cast the net as widely as possibly” (Ericson, 2007a:
47). These efforts to address every imagined source of harm through criminalization end with the
undermining of law (Ericson, 2007a: 208). The above mentioned legislative amendments
exempted body-worn cameras from a broad range of legal requirements and thus undermined
existing standards of law. While these exemptions eroded traditional principles of law, they also
allowed for the criminalization of certain activities. By allowing body-worn cameras to be
engaged inside a private residence, certain activities become visible and potentially criminalized.
As an extension of the surveillant assemblage, body-worn cameras may render certain activities
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visible that would have otherwise remained hidden and thus initiate a criminalizing process
through counter-law.
Variations across the application of counter-law is not only apparent in the legislative
amendments, but also the body-worn camera policy texts put forward by the different police
agencies in the U.S. Variations in body-worn camera pilot projects illustrate differences in the
extension of the surveillant assemblage. The extent to which the surveillant assemblage
manifested itself in body-worn camera pilot programs was dependent on the state in which the
respective police agency was located.
The legality of body-worn camera policy guidelines is generally supported by the
legislative amendments put forward by State General Assemblies through broad exemptions
given to body-worn cameras. There are clear variations in how body-worn camera may be
operated in different states. Body-worn camera uses that may be considered lawful in one
particular state, may be considered unlawful in another. These differences in the legislative
amendments between states illustrate variations in how counter-law I manifests itself. The extent
to which body-worn cameras become part of the existing surveillant assemblage is dependent
upon localized state context. As mentioned earlier, counter-law varies contextually, often
dependent upon the localized politics of uncertainty (see Ericson, 2007a: 208). Given the
considerable degree of state autonomy in the U.S., body-worn camera program variations are to a
degree dependent on the state specific politics of uncertainty.
These politics of uncertainty vary from one state to another. Given the legislative
decision-making autonomy of states, the politics of uncertainty manifests themselves differently
between states. The frequency and severity of police brutality incidents in a particular state
become strong indicators of risk to police legitimacy. Precautionary measures are considered
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exaggerated responses to existing uncertainties. As a precautionary response, body-worn camera
programs are dependent on these localized politics of uncertainty that come about as a result of
police brutality incidents in a particular area.
Counter-law I tends to manifest itself as a reaction to existing legislation that is perceived
as an obstacle during the criminalizing process. Ericson (2007a) does not specifically address the
effects of the absence of legislation and its relationship to the counter-law framework. Currently
in Canada there is no legislation that governs and regulates the use of body-worn cameras.
Existing privacy and freedom of information legislation aims to ameliorate privacy concerns
similar to those that came about with the advent of body-worn cameras. My thesis revealed there
is legal broadness within existing Canadian privacy and freedom of information legislation.
Privacy legislations are typically expected to protect the privacy rights of individual citizens
regarding their personal information. However, personal information can be collected by a
governmental institution if it is issued for law enforcement purposes. The information body-worn
cameras record fall into the definitional boundaries of “personal information” given by the
Privacy Act and Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. However, neither of
these two acts gives an appropriate and detailed definition of what “law enforcement purposes”
entails. Given this, Canadian privacy legislation create the conditions of possibility for bodyworn cameras to be used unhindered for surveillance purposes because legislation gives police
services very broad authority to use personal information as they see fit.
In Canada, counter-law regarding body-worn camera programs as specified by Ericson
(2007a) never took place. Existing privacy legislation had a built in enabling mechanism that
allowed body-worn camera programs to take root within the existing surveillant assemblage
without any legal consequences, as exemplified by the Calgary Police Service’s integration of
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facial recognition technology within their pilot project. In the Canadian context, the absence of
legislation to govern body-worn camera programs shows that there are no legal obstacles that
need to be counteracted with new legislation. As mentioned earlier, the undermining of law is
often the end result of efforts that aim to address imagined sources of harm through
criminalization (Ericson, 2007a: 208). However, in Canada, existing law was not undermined
through these typical terms with the deployment of body-worn camera programs. As such, bodyworn camera programs can be effectively established as a new element in the existing surveillant
assemblage without the need for counter-law. Ericson (2007a) explains that the new elements
being constantly incorporated into the existing surveillant assemblage erode traditional standards
and principles of law. In as much as body-worn camera programs in Canada generate privacy
concerns, their general use is not inhibited by any privacy existing legislation. The broadness of
existing legislation needs to be considered when applying Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law
framework to body-worn camera programs and undoubtedly other similar programs yet to be
hatched.
While the integration of body-worn cameras programs into the existing surveillant
assemblage is moving at an alarming pace, it is not a seamless process, encountering numerous
forms of resistance along the way. As part of the larger counter-law framework, these resistances
manifest themselves differently based on the localized politics of uncertainty. In the U.S., these
variations in resistance are dependent on state context. In some states, legislative amendments
excessively exempted body-worn cameras and thus facilitated their integration into existing
surveillant networks without much resistance. In other states, exemptions were much less
facilitating, and as a result limiting the extent to which body-worn cameras become part of the
existing surveillance network.
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In Canada, there is considerable variation in resistance across different police services.
Officers from the Edmonton Police Service were generally against the adoption of body-worn
cameras. While they did test these devices through a pilot project, after the conclusion of the
project they decided not to equip their officers with cameras (see Casey, 2016). As such, this
limits the extent to which body-worn cameras become part of the existing surveillant assemblage
for Edmonton. In Calgary, resistance to body-worn cameras did not manifest itself to the degree
that it did in Edmonton. After the conclusion of their pilot project, the Calgary Police Service
decided to roll out 1,100 cameras and thus equip all their front line officers with these devices
(see Casey, 2016). While Edmonton and Calgary are both situated in Alberta, there are differing
localized politics of uncertainty that influenced the adoption of body-worn cameras.
In conclusion, body-worn camera programs both in Canada and the U.S. show the
potential to be used for multiple purposes aside from simply monitoring officer conduct. As
evidence shows, these devices are already starting to be used for intelligence gathering and
surveillance. It will be interesting to see what the future holds for body-worn cameras
considering that an increasing number of police services across Canada and the United States are
initiating pilot projects. With the rapid pace of technological development, it is only a matter of
time before body-worn cameras become a common police surveillance device.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF STATE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS AND POLICE
AGENCY BODY-CAM GUIDELINES
Table 1: Summary of State Legislative Amendments – (* indicates states with two consent
systems)
State
Legislatures
(25)

“Amendments
create
exemptions
that allow for
BWC
recording”

“Exemptions
if BWC
recording is
evidentiary
in nature”

California*
Connecticut*
Colorado
District of
Columbia
Florida*

YES
n/a
n/a
YES

YES
n/a
YES
YES

“Amendments
to public
records
request
regarding
BWC
recordings”
YES
YES
n/a
YES

YES

YES

Georgia
Illinois*

YES
YES

Indiana
Iowa

“Legally
bound to
inform
citizen of
BWC
recording”

“Legally
bound to
obtain
consent to
record from
citizens”

NO
n/a
NO
NO

NO
n/a
NO
NO

YES

YES

YES
YES

n/a
YES

n/a
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

NO
YES (only
in some
cases)
NO
YES

YES (only
when inside
someone’s
home)
NO
NO

Kansas

YES

YES

YES

YES

Kentucky
Louisiana
Missouri
Minnesota
Maryland*
Massachusetts*
Nevada
New York
North Dakota

YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
n/a
n/a

YES
YES
n/a
YES
YES
YES
YES
n/a
n/a

NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
n/a
n/a

North Carolina

NO

YES

YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES (if in a
private place)
NO

NO
YES (only
when inside
someone’s
home)
YES (only
when inside
someone’s
home)
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
n/a
n/a

NO

YES

71

South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah

n/a
n/a
YES

YES
NO
YES

YES
NO
NO

Virginia

YES

YES

NO

Washington*

NO

YES

NO

NO
n/a
YES (only
in private
residence)
YES (only
in private
residence)
YES

NO
n/a
NO

YES (only
in private
residence)
NO

Table 2: Summary of police agency body-cam guidelines (*indicates police agencies from states
with two consent systems)
Police
Departments
(33)

Phoenix, AZ
Los Angeles,
CA*
Rialto, CA*
New Haven,
CT*
Denver CO
Washington, DC
Miami, FL*

Atlanta, GA
Chicago, IL*
Greenwood, IN
Iowa City, IA
Coeur d’Alene,
ID
Wichita, KS
Louisville, KY
New Orleans,
LA
Missoula, MT*
Ferguson, MO

“Exemption
to
stop/initiate
recording in
some cases”

“Evidentiary
value of
recordings”

“Considerable
discretionary
power given to
officer”

“Obliged
to inform
citizen
about
camera”

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

NO
NO

“Must
obtain
consent
from citizen
during
recording”
NO
NO

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
NO

NO
NO

NO
NO

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

NO
YES
NO

NO
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

NO
YES
NO
NO
NO

NO
NO
YES (only
inside
private
residence)
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

NO
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO

NO
NO
NO

NO
NO

YES
YES

NO
YES

NO
NO

NO
NO
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Minneapolis,
MN
Baltimore, MD*
Boston, MA*
Las Vegas, NV
New York, NY
Grand Forks,
ND
Charlotte, NC
Cleveland, OH
Charleston, SC
Knoxville, TN
West Valley
City, UT
Gordonsville,
VA
Burlington, VT

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
NO
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
NO
YES
NO

NO
YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
Yes
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
NO
NO
NO
NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

NO

Seattle, WA*

YES

YES

YES

YES (only
in private
residence)
YES

Milwaukee, WI
Mills, WY

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

NO
NO

YES (only
in private
residences)
NO
YES
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